Guilty But Mentally Ill: The Ethical Dilemma Of Mental Illness As A Tool Of The Prosecution by Johansen, Lauren G.
ARTICLE 1 - Johansen (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2015 2:01 PM 
 
GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL: THE 
ETHICAL DILEMMA OF MENTAL 
ILLNESS AS A TOOL OF THE 
PROSECUTION 
LAUREN G. JOHANSEN* 
ABSTRACT 
While other jurisdictions use guilty but mentally ill as a compromise verdict 
to fill the gap between guilty by reason of insanity and a guilty verdict after 
an unsuccessful insanity defense, Alaska has transformed the status into a 
prosecutorial tool to keep mentally ill defendants incarcerated for longer than 
their mentally sane counterparts through denial of “good time” credit. 
Although Blakely was used—correctly—to prevent the denial of the mentally 
ill their Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt in December 2013’s State v. Clifton, the court of appeals 
eliminated any utility from this middle ground, rendering serious mental 
illness short of M’Naghten insanity a per se aggravating circumstance. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article will discuss the current state of the guilty but mentally 
ill (GBMI) verdict in Alaska, the 2012 “Blakely fix,” and the Alaska Court 
of Appeals’ decision in State v. Clifton. This Article will argue that 
prosecution-initiated GBMI is unethical and if not repealed will be 
increasingly used, post-Clifton, by prosecutors to deny mentally ill 
defendants their entitlement to good-time credit and will further dis-
incentivize defense investigation and defense presentation of a 
defendant’s mental illness.  
Part I will provide the reader with an overview of the affirmative 
defense of insanity, the use of evidence of diminished capacity to 
undercut proof of intent, guilty but mentally ill, and civil commitment. 
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Part II will discuss the legal developments that provide a backdrop to 
Ms. Clifton’s appeal, including a discussion of the Apprendi line of 
United States Supreme Court decisions and Forster in Alaska. Part III 
will discuss Clifton and the post-2012 version of section 12.47.030 of the 
Alaska Statutes. Part IV will highlight the GBMI verdict as a tool of the 
prosecution with special emphasis on evidentiary and ethical 
considerations. 
I. INSANITY AND RELATED ADJUDICATIONS IN ALASKA, A 
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL OVERVIEW 
This Part seeks to introduce the social, legal, and medical history of 
the insanity defense and related alternative dispositions in Alaska as 
well as to highlight key movements in Alaska’s political and social 
landscape related to the mentally ill criminal defendant. 
The law has long recognized that a person who suffers from a 
serious mental illness is “not to be regarded as a moral agent, or 
punishable by the law for his acts.”1 Insanity is, at its core, a legal fiction 
created to enhance the predictive value of what is otherwise an 
imprecise or complicated medical standard.2 This Article will not 
discuss the various insanity defense standards that other jurisdictions 
use.3 
A slim majority of United States jurisdictions use the M’Naghten 
test to determine whether a criminal defendant qualifies for an insanity 
acquittal.4 The M’Naghten test arose from public backlash following an 
1843 assassination attempt on British Prime Minister Robert Peel.5 
Daniel M’Naghten was acquitted of murder for fatally shooting one of 
P.M. Peel’s secretaries.6 Following the judgment of acquittal on the basis 
of Mr. M’Naghten’s insanity, a panel of judges was asked a series of 
hypothetical questions about the common law insanity defense as it 
existed at that time.7 The answers to these questions resulted in the 
M’Naghten test of legal insanity.8 Under M’Naghten, an accused may not 
be held criminally responsible if at the time of the criminal conduct she 
 
 1.  Bovard v. State, 30 Miss. 600, 613 (Miss. Err. & App. 1856). 
 2.  WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW § 7.5(a) (5th ed. 2010) (describing the 
American Law Institute’s insanity test). 
 3.  For further reading, see Insanity Defense, 41 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 615 
(2014); see also Andrew March, Note, Insanity in Alaska, 98 GEO. L.J. 1481 (2010). 
 4.   WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 7.2, 7.2(a) (2d ed. 2003). 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
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was suffering from a mental disease or defect which rendered them 
unknowing of either, (a) the nature and quality of the act, or (b) that the 
act was wrong.9 
Alaska currently uses only the first prong of the M’Naghten test: a 
defendant is to be found not guilty if at the time of the offense she was 
“unable, as a result of a mental disease or defect, to appreciate the 
nature and quality of her conduct.”10 M’Naghten has been widely 
criticized in the United States since the 1960’s as inapplicable to mental 
illnesses that result in unlawful actions committed during, and in 
obedience to, prolonged and sustained hallucinatory directives.11 For 
example, a person who experiences auditory hallucinations that direct 
her to kill her children to save them from “Evil” may be able to resist 
such a thought for a time, but eventually, over a period of years, may 
come to believe that it is, indeed, necessary to kill her children in order 
to save them. This person is excluded from a not guilty by reason of 
insanity (NGI) defense in Alaska because she knows that she is killing a 
person, but she cannot resist the directives of her hallucinations. 
Defense counsel must provide written notice to the court of their 
intent to rely on the NGI defense within ten days of entering a plea or at 
another pre-trial juncture if there is good cause for later notice.12 Insanity 
is a complete affirmative defense and negates all criminal culpability for 
the alleged crime.13 However, as Subsection A of this Part, infra, shall 
discuss, the successful insanity defendant will very likely be civilly 
committed for a long, indefinite period following an NGI acquittal, 
which partially explains the rarity of insanity pleas except in extremely 
serious felonies akin to aggravated murder. 
Alaska has both an NGI verdict, which negates culpability, and an 
alternate GBMI verdict, after which the defendant will be exposed to the 
same potential punishment as a sane offender.14 The punishment for a 
GBMI defendant will be the same as a similarly situated “sane” person 
except that the Alaska Department of Corrections (DoC) is required to 
provide mental health treatment during incarceration and the defendant 
is not entitled to parole or furlough during continuing treatment with 
the DoC.15  
 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.010(a) (2013). See, e.g., State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 
944, 949 (Alaska 1987) (holding that Alaska’s Insanity statutes only incorporate 
the first M’Naghten prong, and not the second). 
 11.  Insanity Defense, supra note 3, at 615. 
 12.  § 12.47.010(b). 
 13.  § 12.47.010(d). 
 14.  § 12.47.050. 
 15.  § 12.47.030; § 12.47.050. 
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In Alaska, the GBMI verdict has a different, and more broadly 
applicable, standard for determining mental illness at the time of the 
offense than NGI’s M’Naghten standard. For a defendant to be found 
GBMI, the prosecution or defense must show that, at the time the 
conduct occurred, the defendant lacked as a result of a mental disease or 
defect the substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of 
their conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law.16 
This is a formulation of the American Law Institute Model Penal Code 
definition of legal insanity (ALI).17  
The ALI test is broader than M’Naghten, using the term “substantial 
capacity” to describe the mentally ill person’s volitional ability. The 
drafters of the ALI test noted that the “substantial capacity” part of the 
test accommodates an outsider’s inability to identify a defendant’s 
degree of impairment precisely.18 “Inability to conform conduct to the 
law” solves the deficiency of my previous example, wherein a person is 
ground down over a period of years by auditory hallucinations or other 
mental health symptoms to commit a crime they believe is necessary as 
a result of their disordered thought process.19 Also, the ALI test 
substitutes M’Naghten’s “know” with the ALI’s “appreciate.”20 The 
“appreciate” standard allows an expert witness to enter the defendant’s 
realm of past experiences more easily and also to discuss the affect on 
emotional states of being and the effect on the defendant therein at the 
time of the offense.21 To prevent jurisdictions that may adopt this 
standard from exonerating those persons with nondelusional mental 
disorders—such as psychopathy or personality disorders, which are not 
chemically-treatable mental illnesses but involve diminished empathy, 
remorse, and self-control—the ALI added a definitional, exclusive, 
second paragraph to the test, which reads: “As used in this Article, the 
terms ‘mental disease or defect’ do not include an abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise anti-social 
conduct.”22 Alaska includes this language in its GBMI statute,23 but one 
can also find this language in section 12.47.010(c) of the Alaska 
Statutes.24  
Alaska also allows the defense to present evidence of diminished 
 
 16.  § 12.47.030. 
 17.  See LAFAVE, supra note 2. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id.; MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1962). 
 23.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030(b) (2013). 
 24.  Id. 
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capacity.25 The diminished capacity doctrine allows the defendant to 
introduce evidence that creates a reasonable doubt as to whether she 
formed the requisite mens rea for the crime charged as a result of a 
mental disease or defect. The state has the burden of proving every 
element of the charged crime, including mens rea, beyond a reasonable 
doubt.26 Evidence of diminished capacity is not an affirmative defense, 
but rather a failure-of-proof defense.27 The defendant may still be 
convicted of lesser-included offenses with lesser or no mens rea 
elements (e.g., negligence or strict-liability crimes).28 Alaska requires 
timely notice to the court that the defense will rely on evidence of 
diminished capacity.29 Successful use of the diminished capacity defense 
(either as a complete defense or lesser-included conviction) can only 
result in a verdict of NGI to the charged offense,30 in contrast to a verdict 
of not guilty. The successful diminished capacity defendant is still 
subject to automatic civil commitment, as discussed in Subsection A of 
this Part. 
Following the entry of an NGI verdict, a defendant will be 
involuntarily committed to a mental health treatment facility.31 We now 
turn to a discussion of involuntary civil commitment to illustrate the 
rarity of the NGI defense due to the resulting loss of liberty. 
A. Involuntary Civil Commitment 
When John Hinkley was found not guilty by reason of insanity 
(NGI) following his attempted assassination of Ronald Reagan, the 
public outcry was deafening. Multiple jurisdictions re-wrote statutory 
insanity defenses that had been carefully crafted over years using the 
emerging bio-medical understanding of mental illnesses.32 But even 
before John Hinkley’s Jodie Foster-fueled assassination attempt, Alaska 
had already been especially zealous as a result of the infamous Robert 
Meach murders.33 A discussion of civil commitment, usually of 
 
 25.  § 12.47.020(a). 
 26.  Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 210 (1977). 
 27.  Barrett v. State, 772 P.2d 559, 564 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989).  Diminished 
capacity is not an element of the prosecution’s case-in-chief that must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 571. 
 28.  § 12.47.020. 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  § 12.47.090(b). 
 32.  Lincoln Caplan, The Insanity Defense, Post-Hinkley, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/18/opinion/18tue4 .html 
(last visited March 31, 2015). 
 33.  Robert Meach presented a successful MPC insanity defense to murder in 
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extensive duration, following a defendant’s successful insanity defense, 
was absent from the public discourse during statutory overhaul in many 
jurisdictions including Alaska.34 
Outside of the context of an NGI verdict, civil commitment (or 
parens patriae commitment) is generally authorized when a person is 
found to be (a) under the influence of a mental illness, and (b) as a result 
of her mental illness, a danger to herself or others.35 Both prongs (mental 
illness and dangerousness) must be satisfied to comport with due 
process.36 A mental illness for purposes of civil commitment in Alaska is 
defined by statute: 
[A]n organic, mental, or emotional impairment that has 
substantive adverse effects on an individual’s ability to exercise 
conscious control of the individual’s actions or ability to 
perceive reality or to reason or understand; intellectual 
disability, developmental disability, or both, epilepsy, drug 
addiction, and alcoholism do not per se constitute mental 
illness, although persons suffering from these conditions may 
also be suffering from mental illness.37 
In a commitment hearing for a person who is alleged to be a danger 
 
1973. Then, on May 3, 1981, while out on a day pass from the Alaska Psychiatric 
Institute (API), he killed four teenagers. This crime spurred the Alaska State 
Legislature to repeal the ten-year-old MPC insanity defense, and institute the 
restrictive statutory language that incorporates only the first M’Naghten prong 
and GBMI. Wallace Turner, New Law on Insanity Plea Stirs Dispute in Alaska, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 22, 1982, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1982/06/22/ 
us/new-law-on-insanity-plea-stirs-dispute-in-alaska.html (last visited March 31, 
2015). 
 34.  John Hinkley has spent almost thirty-two years in civil confinement at 
St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in D.C. He has only recently been allowed to go on 
seventeen-day unsupervised trips to stay with family in Williamsburg, VA. 
These trips are transitional to permanent release and began in December 2013, 
following a U.S. District Court ruling for his release. Hospital officials claimed 
his mental illness has been in remission for several years. Ronald Regan Shooter 
Free, ‘Released and Unsupervised’, INT’L BUS. TIMES AUSTL., March 7, 2014,  
available at http://au.ibtimes.com/ronald-reagan-shooter-john-hinckley-free-
released-unsupervised-photo-1334176 (last visited March 31, 2015); Matt 
Zapotosky, Federal judge grants more freedom to John Hinkley Jr., Reagan’s would-be 
assassin, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2013, available at http:// www.washingtonpost 
.com/local/crime/federal-judge-grants-more-freedom-to-reagans-would-be-
assassin/2013/12/20/efdd2c60-68e9-11e3-8b5b-a77187b716a3_story.html (last 
visited March 31, 2015). 
 35.  § 47.30.730(a)(1). See, e.g., O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 
(1975) (noting that involuntary confinement is generally justified by preventing 
harm to the individual and others). 
 36.  See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 (1979) (holding that the state 
must prove these two elements by at least clear and convincing evidence). 
 37.  § 47.30.915(14). 
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to themselves or others, the state need not allege that treatment will 
improve the mentally ill person’s condition.38 Rather, the purpose of 
commitment is to protect either the public or the mentally ill person, 
who may harm herself through some volitional act.39 
The state can also seek to commit those persons who are gravely 
disabled by their mental illness. The gravely disabled option allows the 
state to commit those persons who cannot, as a result of a mental illness, 
“live safely in freedom”40 and who “risk[] harm from passive failure to 
secure their own basic needs.”41 Under this portion of the statute, the 
state must allege that treatment will improve the gravely disabled 
person’s condition. Even if the person is so disabled they cannot care for 
themselves, they still retain important liberty considerations protected in 
the absence of volitional self-harm or harm to others.42 
The time periods in which a person may be involuntarily civilly 
committed are finite and increase in duration. Typically, a person will 
enter the civil commitment track when local police or family member 
take her to a treatment facility following an incident where the peace 
officer has probable cause to believe that the person is mentally ill and 
may be a harm to herself or others and/or gravely disabled.43 A mental 
health professional must evaluate the person within twenty-four hours 
after her arrival at the treatment facility.44 If the evaluator believes the 
person has a mental illness that causes a likelihood of future harm to 
herself or others, or that the person is gravely disabled as a result of 
mental illness, the mental health professional may detain that person on 
an emergency basis and apply for an ex parte order.45 Once a judge 
grants the ex parte order for evaluation, the facility has seventy-two 
hours to evaluate the person for evidence of a mental illness. Before that 
period expires, a judge will make a determination of probable cause for 
 
 38.  E.P. v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 205 P.3d 1101, 1108 (Alaska 2009) (“We 
conclude that the state is not required to show a likelihood that, in the case of a 
mentally ill person who poses a danger to himself, treatment will improve his 
condition.”). 
 39.  Id. at 1110. 
 40.  Wetherhorn v. Alaska Psychiatric Inst., 156 P.3d 371, 377 (Alaska 2007) 
(citing O’Connor, 422 U.S. at 575 n.9). See also § 47.30.915(9)(B) (defining “gravely 
disabled,” in part, as a condition associated with the deterioration of a person’s 
ability to function independently). 
 41.  E.P., 205 P.3d at 1110. 
 42.  See id. (distinguishing between the gravely disabled, who risk harm 
from passive failure to secure basic needs, and those who are likely to harm 
themselves or others, who risk harm by acting affirmatively). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.710 (2013). 
 45.  Id. The mentally ill person is also appointed counsel for the thirty-day 
commitment period hearing. Id. 
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commitment for thirty days, then for a period of ninety days, and finally 
for a period of 180 days, which will subsequently repeat on 180-day 
intervals until the person can live safely in freedom.46 
B. Committing NGI Acquittees 
A defendant who is acquitted via a not guilty by reason of insanity 
verdict is almost always committed to a mental health treatment facility. 
The NGI acquittee is entitled to a hearing before the trier of fact at the 
same trial as to whether the defendant presently poses a danger to 
themselves or others as a result of a mental illness.47 At this hearing, the 
defendant must show by clear and convincing evidence that she no 
longer suffers from “any mental illness that causes the defendant to be 
dangerous to the public” to avoid automatic civil commitment.48 If the 
defendant fails to meet this burden, the court shall order the defendant 
committed.49 
The state has the power to commit NGI acquittees for periods 
longer than the statutory maximum sentence following Jones v. United 
States.50 In this case, Mr. Jones, a paranoid schizophrenic, was acquitted 
NGI for petit larceny, a misdemeanor crime.51 Mr. Jones was held 
involuntarily at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in D.C. for over one year (thus, 
placing him beyond the maximum period of incarceration for a 
misdemeanor).52 Mr. Jones argued that an NGI acquittal did not 
constitute a finding of present mental illness and dangerousness as 
Addington v. Texas required, and that a past criminal conviction had little 
to no predictive value of future dangerousness.53 The court disagreed: 
The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, to have committed a criminal act certainly indicates 
dangerousness. Indeed, this concrete evidence generally may 
be at least as persuasive as any predictions about 
dangerousness that might be made in a civil commitment 
proceeding. We do not agree . . . that the requisite 
dangerousness is not established by proof that a person 
committed a non-violent crime against property.54 
 
 46.  §§ 47.30.715–755. 
 47.  § 12.47.090. 
 48.  §§ 12.47.090(a)–(c). 
 49.  § 12.47.090(c). 
 50.  463 U.S. 354 (1983). 
 51.  Id. at 360. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. at 362. 
 54.  Id. at 364–65. 
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Jones also requires periodic review hearings to comport with due 
process,55 and requires the release of NGI acquittees no longer suffering 
from mental illness.56 Despite the overlap between NGI, civil 
commitment, incarceration, and indefinite commitment of NGI 
acquittees, civil commitment of NGI acquittees does not violate the 
prohibition on double jeopardy.57  
An extended NGI commitment is reviewed annually by the 
committing court, and is subject to the standards previously discussed 
for a thirty-day involuntary civil commitment.58 Evidence of the 
underlying crime, in conjunction with evidence of the defendant’s 
inability to appreciate her actions, will be compelling evidence of danger 
to the community in an annual commitment hearing. Evidence of the 
risk of danger extends the commitment indefinitely, depending on the 
severity of the mental illness. The DoC can petition for civil commitment 
of GBMI defendants at the conclusion of their sentence if they continue 
to receive treatment and the DoC has good cause to believe the person is 
still mentally ill and poses a threat to themselves or public safety.59 
A commitment’s temporal uncertainty for the mentally ill 
defendant partially explains defense counsel’s reluctance to recommend 
their clients pursue an insanity defense, present evidence of diminished 
capacity, or seek a GBMI verdict. Troublingly, these verdicts expose a 
mentally ill defendant to a longer period of incarceration than a 
similarly situated “sane” person.  
II. THE PLAGUE: PRE-2012 GBMI IN ALASKA 
Alaska revised its insanity defense statute to include only the first 
prong of the M’Naghten test following the outcry over Robert Meach’s 
second murder. To be found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGI), a 
defendant must show that at the time of the offense he was unable to 
appreciate the nature and quality of his conduct as a result of a mental 
disease or defect.60 Practically, this first prong will only apply to a 
defendant who, when firing a gun at another person, did not 
 
 55.  Id. at 368. However, the state has no burden of showing the two prongs 
of civil commitment—continuing mental illness and dangerousness—under the 
automatic commitment model. Id. 
 56.  Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 81 (1992). The NGI acquittee with no 
remaining treatable mental illness must be released. Therefore, an NGI acquittee, 
like Foucha, cannot be held on the basis of a remaining personality disorder. Id. 
 57.  Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 369 (1997). 
 58.  ALASKA STAT. § 47.30.735 (2013). 
 59.  § 12.47.050(e). 
 60.  § 12.47.010. 
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understand that the bullet could potentially kill that person. The 
M’Naghten test in NGI would not apply to the person who believes that 
shooting a person is not illegal or is not morally wrong as a result of 
their mental illness. Given the extremely limited availability of an 
insanity defense in Alaska following this statutory revision, the 
legislature adopted an alternative verdict: guilty but mentally ill 
(GBMI).61 In the NGI scenario, after the defense presents an insanity 
defense, the jury will also be instructed that if they do not find an NGI 
verdict, they must consider a possible GBMI verdict.62 Then, if the 
prosecution has proven all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt and the defense has not successfully presented an insanity 
defense, the jury must reject an NGI verdict and consider a verdict of 
GBMI.63 To find the defendant GBMI in the NGI/GBMI context, the jury 
applies the ALI test of insanity.64 
Before the 2012 Blakely fix of Alaska’s GBMI statutes, a trial judge 
determined GBMI based on a preponderance of the evidence standard in 
a post-conviction hearing.65 A post-conviction GBMI hearing could be 
requested by the defense, prosecution, or on the court’s own motion.66 
During the GBMI hearing, the court would determine whether the 
defendant met the ALI definition of insanity as previously described in 
Part I, supra.67 The ALI test of insanity is less stringent than the 
M’Naghten NGI analysis. If the defendant was found GBMI under the 
ALI test, the court would enter a verdict of GBMI and thereby the DoC 
would deny any good time credit or furlough for the duration of the 
incarcerated person’s treatment.68 Pre-2012, there was no DoC policy to 
allow the defendant to review the necessity of continued treatment 
following a GBMI finding.69 No such provision exists today.70 
Following entry of a GMBI verdict the court will sentence the 
 
 61.  § 12.47.040. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  § 12.47.040(c). 
 64.  § 12.47.050. 
 65.  § 12.47.060, amended by §§ 6–7, 2012 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 70. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  § 12.47.030. 
 68.  See § 12.47.050 (“[A] defendant receiving treatment under . . . this section 
may not be released . . . on furlough . . . or . . . on parole.”). 
 69.  Crimes Against Children, S. 210, 27th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Alaska 2012), 
http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=S&beg_line=002
50&end_line=00804&session=27&comm=JUD&date=20120210&time=1333. 
 70.  The Department of Corrections does provide for review of the 
defendant’s continuing mental illness under § 12.47.050(e), but this review is 
only pursuant to determining whether the commissioner is required to file a 
petition for involuntary civil commitment under § 47.30.070, and occurs thirty 
days before the end of the defendant’s sentence. 
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defendant the same way as a similarly situated sane person and the DoC 
will provide mental health treatment to the defendant for a length of 
time depending on the severity of her mental illness.71 As long as the 
mentally ill defendant is in treatment during her sentence, she is neither 
eligible for release on furlough (except for treatment in a “secure 
facility”) nor eligible for parole.72 The computation for awarding credit 
for “good time,” set forth by statute,73 is not available for the GBMI 
defendant who is still in treatment with the DOC.74 
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Apprendi v. New Jersey,75 
which held that due process and the Sixth Amendment required any fact 
(other than a prior conviction) that increases punishment beyond a 
statutory maximum sentence be submitted and proved to a jury beyond 
a reasonable doubt.76 The Court went on in a 2004 decision, Blakely v. 
Washington,77 to hold that the Sixth Amendment required a jury finding 
beyond a reasonable doubt of any fact that would increase a mandatory 
guideline sentence within a statutory sentencing range (not merely the 
maximum sentence allowed by law).78 
Alaska applied the Apprendi and Blakely holdings to section 
33.020.010 of the Alaska Statutes’ good time computation in a 2010 court 
of appeals decision, Forster v. State.79 At trial, Mr. Forster was convicted 
of first-degree murder for killing Kenai Police Officer John Watson.80 
Typically, a first-degree murder conviction has a sentencing range of 20-
99 years to serve.81 However, a 99-year mandatory sentence without the 
possibility of parole applies if the defendant is convicted of first-degree 
murder of “a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer . . . 
who was engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the 
murder.”82 Although there was no dispute that Officer Watson was 
uniformed and engaging in official duties at the time of his death, the 
jury did not make that finding at trial.83 Following Blakely, the superior 
 
 71.  § 12.47.050(b). 
 72.  § 12.47.050. 
 73.  See § 33.20.010(a) (“[Defendants are] entitled to a deduction of one-third 
of the term of imprisonment rounded off to the nearest day if the prisoner 
follows the rules of the correctional facility in which the prisoner is confined.”). 
 74.  § 12.47.050. 
 75.  530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 76.  Id. at 490. 
 77.  542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 78.  Id. at 303–04. 
 79.  236 P.3d 1157 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 
 80.  Id. at 1160. 
 81.  ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125(a) (2013). 
 82.  § 12.55.125(a)(1). 
 83.  Forster, 236 P.3d at 1169. 
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court declined to impose the mandatory 99-year sentence without parole 
because the jury did not make a required finding of fact.84 The superior 
court entered the maximum sentence of ninety-nine years.85 The court of 
appeals then determined whether “a defendant is entitled to have a jury 
find the facts that result in [an] elimination of the good-time deduction” 
by restricting the defendant’s right to parole.86 The court of appeals 
affirmed the lower court and held that “a sentencing court may not 
restrict or eliminate a defendant’s good-time credit and mandatory 
parole without holding a jury trial on the aggravating circumstance.”87 
This decision brought the denial of good-time credit under the auspices 
of Blakely in Alaska. 
In 2009, while presiding over State v. Clifton,88 Judge Volland of the 
Alaska Superior Court in Anchorage saw that the GBMI statute, as 
written, violated Blakely by denying GBMI defendants good-time credit 
on facts not determined by a jury.89 Around that same time, the State of 
Alaska went about crafting a “Blakely Fix” of the GBMI statutes to 
require a jury finding of GBMI.90  
However, a finding of GBMI by jury was not enough to cure the 
defense community’s unease regarding defense-initiated presentation of 
mental illness. During a presentation before the House Judiciary on 
GBMI in 2012, the Deputy Director for the Public Defender Agency, 
Criminal Division, stated that: 
GBMI provisions currently doesn’t [sic] effect a great many 
clients, because defense counsel will do everything possible to 
avoid a GBMI verdict because it results in greater punishment 
for the client because they don’t get parole, they’re not eligible 
 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. at 1170. 
 87.  Id. at 1172. However, the court also found that the superior court was 
required to impose the restriction on discretionary parole that is mandated in § 
12.55.125(a)—the offense for which the defendant was convicted at trial. This is 
because in a previous Alaska Supreme Court case—State v. Malloy—the court 
held that a sentencing court has the statutory authority to impose a 99-year 
sentence with no eligibility for parole even without the finding of an 
aggravating circumstance in a first-degree murder sentencing. See id. at 1170 
(discussing State v. Malloy, 46 P.3d 949, 954 (Alaska 2002)). 
 88.  315 P.3d 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013). 
 89.  Id. at 702–03. 
 90.  Act of July 1, 2012, §§ 6–7, 2012 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 70; see also Hearing 
on S. 210 Before the H. Finance Comm., ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg., 
2nd Sess. (April 13, 2012) (statement of Anne Carpeneti, Assistant Att’y Gen. of 
the Alaska Department of Law), available at http://www.legis. 
state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=H&9beg_line=01083&end_line=014
65&session=27&comm=FIN&date=20120413&time=0912. 
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for early release to a halfway house, or anything like that. So, 
we try and avoid it like the plague.91 
III. CITO, LONGE, TARDE: POST-2012 GBMI IN ALASKA AND 
STATE V. CLIFTON 
A. 2012 GBMI Amendments 
In response to the Blakely decision, the Alaska Legislature amended 
section 12.47.060 of the Alaska Statutes to require that guilty but 
mentally ill (GBMI), if raised by the prosecution, must be proven to the 
jury beyond a reasonable doubt unless waived by the defense.92 The bill 
was originally introduced as SB 186, sponsored by the Senate Judiciary 
Committee and was intended to reconcile Alaska GBMI to the U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions in Blakely and Apprendi.93  
The statutory changes would apply “to [all] proceedings occurring 
on or after the effective date of this Act.”94 These changes apply 
regardless of whether the defendant committed an offense “before, on or 
after the effective date of this Act.”95 Therefore, the GBMI statutory 
revisions retroactively applied to Ms. Clifton’s 2006 offense and the 2009 
superior court trial. 
Meanwhile, the State had already appealed the superior court’s 
decision in State v. Clifton. We now turn to a detailed look at Ms. 
Clifton’s trial and the result of the State’s appeal. 
B. State v. Clifton: The Superior Court Case 
On August 2, 2006, Ms. Clifton pressed a loaded handgun into her 
 
 91.  Statement of Douglas Moody, Hearing on S. 186 Before the S. Judiciary 
Comm., ALASKA S. JUDICIARY COMM, Minutes, 27th Leg., 2nd Sess. (Feb. 10, 2012) 
(statement of Douglas Moody, Deputy Director for the Public Defender Agency, 
Criminal Division), available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_ 
minute.asp?ch=S&beg_line=00250&end_line=00804&session=27&comm=JUD&
date=20120210&time=1333. 
 92.  Act of July 1, 2012, §§ 6–7, 2012 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 70; see also Hearing 
on S. 210 Before the H. Finance Comm., ALASKA S. FIN. COMM. MINUTES, 27th Leg., 
2nd Sess. (April 13, 2012) (statement of Anne Carpeneti, Assistant Att’y Gen. of 
the Alaska Department of Law), available at http://www. 
legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_single_minute.asp?ch=H&9beg_line=01083&end_lin
e=01465&session=27&comm=FIN&date=20120413&time=0912. 
 93.  Hearing on S. 186 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., supra note 90. 
 94.  Crimes/Sentencing/Parole/Victims, § 17, 2012 Alaska Sess. Laws ch. 70, 
7, available at http://www.legis.state.ak.us/basis/get_bill_text.asp?hsid= 
SB0210Z&session=27. 
 95.  Id. 
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supervisor’s ribcage. Ms. Clifton believed the government conspired to 
ruin her life and harm her physically.96 She claimed she had been raped 
in Saudi Arabia by a high-ranking military officer who now lives in 
Anchorage.97 Ms. Clifton told co-workers about the government 
conspiracy against her, prompting her supervisor, Steven Mayer, to 
decide she needed to undergo a psychiatric evaluation before returning 
to work.98 During a meeting on this issue, Ms. Clifton became agitated, 
pushed a loaded gun into Mr. Mayer’s ribs, and pulled the trigger.99 Ms. 
Clifton used a semi-automatic handgun that required the user to “rack” 
the top slide; she failed to do this. No round entered the chamber and no 
bullet fired.100 Officers responding to the incident found five rounds 
inside the gun, a loaded magazine in her purse, and six loose rounds of 
ammunition in her bag.101 Ms. Clifton was indicted on one count of 
attempted first-degree murder and one count of third-degree assault for 
placing her supervisor in fear of serious physical injury.102 
Ms. Clifton sent Judge Volland a handwritten pro se letter from jail 
in May 2007 reiterating her belief in a government conspiracy against 
her.103 In this letter she complained of her treatment in prison and of her 
appointed counsel.104 Ms. Clifton’s counsel requested a competency 
evaluation.105 Ms. Clifton was sent to API for evaluation by Dr. Lois 
Michauld, and based on Dr. Michauld’s findings, Ms. Clifton was found 
not competent to stand trial.106 Following the State’s request for an 
additional evaluation from an alternate individual, Dr. David Sperbeck 
evaluated Ms. Clifton, and like Dr. Michauld, he concluded that Ms. 
Clifton was not competent to stand trial and that she suffered from a 
“Delusional Disorder, Persecutory Type.”107 Ms. Clifton was committed 
to API in August of 2008 for restoration of competency.108 Ms. Clifton 
had three intervening competency evaluations and subsequent hearings 
in October, November, and December of 2008 before she was found 
 
 96.  Brief for Petitioner at 3, State v. Clifton, 315 P.3d 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2013) (No. A-10941). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Clifton, 315 P.3d at 698. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Brief for Petitioner, supra note 96, at 7. 
 103.  Id. 
 104.  Id. 
 105.  Id. at 8. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. 
 108.  Id. 
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competent to stand trial in January 2009 and a trial date was set.109 
The State filed Motion to Preclude Argument/Evidence of Insanity 
or Diminished Capacity at Trial on July 13, 2009, and indicated it would 
seek a GBMI finding following a guilty verdict using the pre-2012 GBMI 
statutes.110 The State changed this position in September and gave notice 
that if Ms. Clifton took the stand the State would seek a GBMI jury 
instruction, as well as call either of the competency evaluators to testify 
as to Ms. Clifton’s mental health.111 The defense objected to the use of 
competency evaluators as expert witnesses to Ms. Clifton’s mental 
illness at the time of the offense and the superior court ordered Ms. 
Clifton to submit to a psychiatric evaluation for a possible State-initiated 
GBMI finding.112 Ms. Clifton exercised her Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination and refused to submit to a psychiatric 
evaluation.113 
Ms. Clifton’s trial occurred in late October 2009, during which her 
supervisors and responding officers only hinted at her mental illness 
and defense counsel presented no evidence of her mental illness. The 
state did not seek a jury instruction on GBMI. The jury returned a 
verdict of guilty of attempted murder and assault in the third degree on 
November 4, 2009. Following trial the prosecutor moved the court to 
find Ms. Clifton GBMI.114 The defense objected to the constitutionality of 
the post-trial GBMI on the following three grounds: 
 
 
 
 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  Id at 9. 
 111.  Id. 
 112.  Id. at 13. These actions on behalf of the state begin to reveal the pressure 
placed on Ms. Clifton to bring her mental illness into the trial. The state, in its 
petition for review argued “that without a proper instruction on the possibility 
of a GBMI determination. . . [Ms.] Clifton might get the windfall of an 
undeserved outright acquittal if jurors concluded that she was mentally ill but 
did not know how to factor that into the traditional guilty/not guilty choice.” Id. 
at 11. To which defense counsel “essentially confirmed that he was gambling on 
such an implicit insanity acquittal.” Id. This statement about the defense 
counsel’s “gamble” is the first in a series of implicit and unfair criticisms from 
the state, and the court of appeals, directed towards defense counsel’s strategy at 
trial. As discussed in Part I, supra, and as confirmed by the holding of Clifton, the 
defense counsel had ample reasons to exclude evidence of mental illness at trial. 
These reasons included: limiting incarceration (including the possibility of civil 
commitment), providing the possibility of parole, protecting Ms. Clifton from 
the stigma of mental illness, and limiting the release of invasive psychiatric 
evaluations. 
 113.  Id. at 13. 
 114.  Clifton, 315 P.3d at 700. 
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1. A GBMI verdict violates due process and equal 
protection when the defense did not place her mental 
status at issue through an NGI or diminished capacity 
defense, 
2. The GBMI’s judicial determination violated Ms. 
Clifton’s right to a jury trial post-Blakely v. Washington, 
3. Post-trial determination of GBMI would violate the 
proscription of double jeopardy. 
 
After a hearing on GBMI, Judge Volland found, based on a 
preponderance of the evidence, that Ms. Clifton met the definition of 
GBMI, but concluded the judicial determination of GBMI violated equal 
protection when Ms. Clifton did not place her mental illness at issue.115 
The superior court reasoned that to enter a verdict of GBMI in a post-
trial procedure such as the pre-2012, section 12.47.050(d) of the Alaska 
Statutes would violate Ms. Clifton’s constitutional rights to equal 
protection and due process of law.116 In doing so, the superior court 
reached two legal conclusions. First, section 12.47.50(d) of the Alaska 
Statutes, by barring GBMI defendants from parole during treatment, 
violated equal protection of the law because it infringed upon a 
fundamental liberty interest in good time credits while similarly situated 
sane people would be released under the same circumstances.117 Second, 
post-Blakely, GBMI violated Ms. Clifton’s Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial.118 The superior court determined that, because a GBMI verdict 
functionally increased Ms. Clifton’s exposure to the maximum 
punishment, she was entitled to a jury trial on the issue of GBMI and 
that the government had to prove GBMI beyond a reasonable doubt.119 
C. State v. Clifton: The Court of Appeals Decision 
The State appealed the sentencing court’s decision on GBMI.120 Ms. 
Clifton argued that the court of appeals should uphold the decision on 
the ground that in proving GBMI, the prosecution violated her right 
against self-incrimination by presenting the results of her competency 
evaluation.121 In its December 27, 2013 opinion, the Alaska Court of 
Appeals discussed six legal issues: Blakely v. Washington, expert 
witnesses, equal protection, due process, issues related to fair play, and 
finally, double jeopardy. This Article will discuss these issues in the 
 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  Id. (summarizing the superior courts’ reasoning). 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. 
 119.  Id. at 701. 
 120.  Id. at 698. 
 121.  Id. 
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order presented in the opinion.  
1. Blakely 
 
The Alaska Court of Appeals agreed with the superior court that 
Blakely precludes the superior court from finding Ms. Clifton GBMI 
without a jury determination.122 
The court of appeals stated: 
This good time credit, and the accompanying right to 
mandatory parole, is not a discretionary aspect of Clifton’s 
sentence. The superior court has no sentencing authority to 
diminish Clifton’s good time credit, or to declare her ineligible 
for parole. Rather, Clifton’s eligibility for mandatory parole can 
be restricted only if she is found guilty but mentally ill.123 
Relying on Forster and Blakely, the court of appeals found the pre-
2012 GBMI statute, in allowing the judge to be the fact finder under a 
preponderance of the evidence standard, violated the defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to jury trial.124 However, the statutory revisions in 
2012 cured this deficiency, supra, Part II. Therefore, Judge Volland 
correctly decided that the post-trial judicial determination was 
unconstitutional under Blakely. 
2. Equal Protection 
 
Ms. Clifton argued at trial and in her response brief that because 
the GBMI verdict infringed on her fundamental liberty interest to be 
released at the same time as other inmates convicted of the same crime, 
and because the distinction is made on the basis of mental illness, the 
GBMI verdict in Alaska cannot survive any level of equal protection 
scrutiny.125 Ms. Clifton contended that section 12.47.050 of the Alaska 
Statutes equated mental illness with dangerousness without making 
dangerousness a separate showing at the trial court level, or at any level 
of DoC review.126 As Ms. Clifton argued, equating mental illness with 
dangerousness is antithetical to civil commitment in Alaska and 
offensive to mental health professionals.127 Clifton further suggested that 
 
 122.  Id. at 702. 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Brief for Respondent at 34, State v. Clifton, 315 P.3d 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 
2013) (No. A-10941). 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. at 36. 
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this creates a problem of underinclusion in that Alaska’s GBMI statute 
presupposes that all mentally ill persons are more dangerous than 
mentally stable persons who commit the same crimes.128 
In rejecting the dangerousness argument, the court of appeals 
reasoned that “proof that a defendant suffered from a mental illness at 
the time of the offense is not enough to support a verdict” of GBMI.129 
Rather, to support a GBMI verdict, the State must prove both “that the 
defendant [suffers] from a mental illness and that, because of this mental 
illness, the defendant lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the 
wrongfulness of their conduct or to conform their conduct to the 
requirements of law.”130 Thus, according to the court of appeals, the 
State must support both the mental illness and dangerousness of a 
defendant.131 The court of appeals went on to reject the respondent’s 
underinclusion argument, reasoning that the Alaska State Legislature 
could reasonably conclude that the GBMI defendant “will be 
significantly less receptive to parole supervision and control.”132 In this 
section, the court of appeals upheld the constitutionality of Alaska’s 
GBMI statute on equal protection grounds. 
3. Due Process 
 
The court continued on to address the respondent’s due process 
concerns. Here, the court once again faced a problem of DoC review in a 
GBMI case. In 1993’s Monroe v. State, the defendant argued that Alaska’s 
GBMI statute does not provide an opportunity to review the necessity of 
ongoing mental health treatment nor does it provide review of 
defendant’s continuing mental illness while incarcerated.133 As 
previously discussed in Parts I and II, supra, the DoC today has no 
mechanism to review a defendant’s ongoing mental health diagnosis in 
the GBMI context. In footnote four of Monroe, the court of appeals stated 
that some type of review of the defendant’s ongoing need for mental 
health treatment while the defendant could be eligible for good time 
 
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Clifton, 315 P.3d at 703. 
 130.  Id. at 710 (citing ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.030(a)). The court went on to 
briefly discuss the requirement of a procedural mechanism to “seek eligibility 
for parole and furlough by demonstrating their lack of continued 
dangerousness.” Id. at 704 (citing Monroe v. State, 847 P.2d 84, 90 n.4 (Alaska Ct. 
App. 1993)). However, the court did not make a decision on this issue because 
the issue was not yet ripe in Ms. Clifton’s situation. Id. at 704. 
 131.  Id. (affirming Monroe, 847 P.2d at 90 n.4). 
 132.  Id. 
 133.  Monroe, 847 P.2d at 90 n.4. 
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must be provided.134 However, the court recognized the issue was not 
yet ripe for review.135 As Mr. Monroe was sentenced to sixty years’ 
incarceration, the issue in his case is unlikely to surface any time soon.136 
In Clifton, the court of appeals reiterated the necessity for review at the 
DoC level, but once again concluded the issue was not yet ripe for due 
process review.137 
4. Fair Play 
 
An overarching theme of Ms. Clifton’s argument on appeal and 
likely obvious to anyone encountering Alaska’s GBMI scheme on first 
blush, is that it is fundamentally unfair to subject a mentally ill person 
who does not place their mental illness at issue during trial to a harsher 
sentence than one who successfully hides their mental illness.138 Ms. 
Clifton framed this issue on the basis of equal protection, but the court 
of appeals separated the issue of fundamental fairness and framed it in 
terms of the punishment imposed.139 
The court of appeals separated Ms. Clifton’s argument into two 
alleged consequences of a GBMI verdict to a defendant: first, she would 
be forced to undergo mental health treatment while in DoC custody; and 
second, she would be ineligible for parole or furlough while undergoing 
this treatment.140 In rejecting Ms. Clifton’s first alleged consequence, the 
court of appeals interpreted section 12.47.050(b) of the Alaska Statutes’ 
treatment provision as non-compulsory.141 Therefore, Ms. Clifton could 
arguably refuse treatment by the DoC. However, the court noted: “this 
would seemingly mean that defendants who did not spontaneously get 
better would never be released on parole or furlough.”142 
As to her second alleged consequence, the defendant argued that 
giving “disparate treatment to defendants who have not placed their 
 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See id. (“Monroe would be ineligible for discretionary parole for an 
extended period of time.”). 
 137.  Clifton, 315 P.3d at 704–05. 
 138.  Whether or not it is also fundamentally unfair to subject a mentally ill 
person to a harsher punishment as a result of a crime committed while mentally 
ill at all could be the subject of an entire article and will be left to a more capable 
mind. 
 139.  See Brief for Respondent, supra note 125, at 16–20. See also Clifton, 315 
P.3d at 705–07 (discussing the unfairness of lack of parole and different 
sentences). 
 140.  Clifton, 315 P.3d at 699. 
 141.  Id. at 705. 
 142.  Id. 
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mental illness at issue” was fundamentally unfair.143 She also argued 
that a GBMI verdict was the “‘price’ that a defendant risks if the she 
raises a defense based on mental disease or defect and is 
unsuccessful.”144 However, the court of appeals pointed out that section 
12.47.020(a) of the Alaska Statutes allows evidence of a defendant’s 
mental disease or defect if such evidence is “relevant to prove that the 
defendant did or did not have a culpable mental state which is an 
element of the crime.”145 The court reasoned: 
AS 12.47.020(a) limits the admissibility of this evidence only in 
the sense that if a defendant wishes to introduce evidence of 
their mental disease or defect to negate a culpable mental state, 
the defendant must give the State and the trial court advance 
notice. Thus, under AS 12.47.020(a), the State can introduce 
evidence of a defendant’s mental disease or defect if this 
evidence is relevant to support the state’s allegations concerning 
the defendant’s mental state.146 
This discussion of the admissibility of evidence regarding the 
defendant’s mental state leads us to the fifth argument of Clifton, the 
advisability of using a mental health professional who evaluated a 
mentally ill defendant for competency to testify as to the defendant’s 
mental state at a GBMI trial. 
5. Expert Witnesses 
 
There was an overarching disagreement whether Dr. Sperbeck 
should have been allowed to testify at Ms. Clifton’s post-trial hearing for 
GBMI.147 Dr. Sperbeck only evaluated Ms. Clifton for competency and 
Ms. Clifton invoked her Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination in response to a judicial order to submit a mental health 
evaluation to determine her mental state at the time of the crime. Dr. 
Sperbeck evaluated Ms. Clifton for competency several times.148 At Ms. 
Clifton’s hearing on GBMI, the prosecution called Dr. Sperbeck to testify 
as to Ms. Clifton’s mental state at the time of the crime for the purpose 
 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id. at 706. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Id. (emphasis in original). 
 147.  See id. at 701, 706 (concluding that the government’s use of Dr. Sperbeck 
as a witness was not a constitutional violation). Compare Brief for Respondent, 
supra note 125, at 16–20, with Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 1–12 , State v. Clifton, 315 
P.3d 694 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013) (No. A-10941). 
 148.  Clifton, 315 P.3d at 699. 
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of a GBMI determination.149 Ms. Clifton asked the court of appeals to 
affirm the superior court’s decision on the grounds that including Dr. 
Sperbeck’s testimony violated her right against self-incrimination.150 Dr. 
Sperbeck stated that he could put aside his earlier examination of Ms. 
Clifton and objectively assess Ms. Clifton.151 Judge Volland accepted Dr. 
Sperbeck’s statement and allowed him to testify as an expert witness, 
and the court of appeals allowed this assessment to stand.152 
The court of appeals went on to say that evidence of a mental 
illness was admissible for purposes of proving the defendant’s mental 
state at the commission of the offense.153 This includes evidence of 
mental illness for purposes of a GBMI determination.154 This is because 
Blakely has placed the burden of proving all the elements of GBMI on the 
prosecution when the defendant has not raised this issue at trial.155 The 
elements of GBMI are distinct from the elements of the underlying 
offense.156 Therefore, “the State can introduce evidence of a defendant’s 
mental disease or defect if this evidence is relevant to support the state’s 
allegations concerning the defendant’s mental state.”157 
The court of appeals, in this portion of Clifton, allowed the 
possibility that a previous competency evaluator could be able to ignore 
several previous mental health evaluations and rely only on an objective 
determination. This portion of the court’s decision will be discussed 
further in Part IV(A) of this Article, infra. 
6. Bifurcation 
 
In the event of a trial wherein neither the defense nor the 
prosecution makes mental illness an issue, the prosecution can still seek 
GBMI after a guilty verdict.158 Here, the “evidence of the defendant’s 
mental disease or defect will be relevant only if the defendant is 
convicted, because it is relevant to the type of disposition that the 
sentencing court should impose on the defendant”—i.e., eligibility for 
early release on parole.159 
The result is a bifurcated trial wherein the issue of guilt or 
 
 149.  Id. at 701. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. at 701–02. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  Id. at 706. 
 154.  Id. at 701–02. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Id. at 710. 
 157.  Id. at 706 (emphasis in original). 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id. at 707. 
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innocence is adjudicated and a guilty verdict is entered, followed by 
defense or prosecution’s motion to have the issue of GBMI litigated in 
front of the same jury that decided guilt.160 If the prosecution raises the 
issue, the defendant is entitled to a trial by jury on GBMI and a finding 
of GBMI beyond a reasonable doubt.161 This procedure, according to the 
court of appeals, complies with Blakely, as discussed earlier, supra. 
In the second, GBMI portion of the trial, the prosecution must 
prove all elements of GBMI as separate and distinct from the underlying 
charged offense.162 
7. Double Jeopardy 
 
The court of appeals briefly concluded that subjecting Ms. Clifton 
to a second trial to determine GBMI would not violate double jeopardy. 
The court reasoned the elements of GBMI are separate and distinct from 
the underlying offense.163 Also, Ms. Clifton’s counsel was insistent that 
all evidence of mental illness must be excluded from her trial.164 
8. Final Points 
 
The court was unclear, however, about whether the potential GBMI 
defendant’s right to a jury trial under a “beyond a reasonable doubt” 
standard would apply if the defense raised the GBMI issue following a 
guilty verdict. The court only stated: “Because . . . the defendant faces an 
increased maximum sentence if the jury decides in the government’s 
favor on this issue, the defendant is entitled to trial by jury and to proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”165  
Additionally, the court did not address the situation in which the 
defense attempted an unsuccessful NGI defense and then the GBMI 
verdict is presented as an alternative to the jury, as required by statute.  
The court of appeals upheld the superior court’s determination that the 
pre-2012 version of section 12.47.060 of the Alaska Statutes was 
unconstitutional post-Blakely, but the court did not find the punishment 
enhancement of GBMI unconstitutional as the superior court previously 
determined.166 
 
 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 706; Forster v. State, 236 P.3d 1157, 1170–72 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010). 
 162.  Clifton, 315 P.3d at 710. 
 163.  Id. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. at 707. 
 166.  Id. at 703–05. 
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IV. MENTAL ILLNESS AS A TOOL OF THE PROSECUTION 
But Talus sternely did upon them set, 
And brusht and battred them without remorse, 
That on the ground he left full many a corse; 
Ne any able was him to withstand, 
But he them overthrew both man and horse, 
That they lay scattred over all the land, 
As thicke as doth the seede after the sowers hand. 
 
-Edmund Spencer, The Faerie Queen 
Book V, Canto XII 
 
The court of appeals decision in State v. Clifton further complicates 
Alaska’s already strained relationship between mental illness and 
criminal behavior. Now, a traditionally defense-oriented tool has been 
crowned by the appellate court as a per se sentencing aggravator for 
persons suffering from mental illness.  
This Part addresses a potential broader use of guilty but mentally 
ill (GBMI) in Alaska post-Clifton, and will examine two practical issues 
the defense and prosecution will encounter during these proceedings, 
one evidentiary and one ethical. This Part concludes with a discussion of 
the Coordinated Resources Project (CRP or Mental Health Court) and 
will show that the prosecution will gain no benefit from participating in 
these elective programs post-Clifton. 
A. Evidentiary Issues: Competency Evaluations and Expert 
Witnesses 
Pre-Clifton, the use of competency evaluations in State criminal 
proceedings existed in a nebulous and unclear state. The U.S. Supreme 
Court in Estelle v. Smith167 stated that competency evaluations are 
conducted for a limited, neutral purpose.168 In Alaska, use of 
competency evaluations for evidence in an adversarial proceeding 
violates the defendant’s right against self-incrimination.169 However, 
R.H. v. State’s prohibition on competency evaluations in criminal 
prosecutions is not as strong as one might view on first blush. In Monroe 
v. State, the court of appeals found that it was not plain error for a trial 
judge to allow a competency evaluator to testify as to GBMI if defense 
 
 167.  451 U.S. 454 (1981). 
 168.  Id. at 465. 
 169.  R.H. v. State, 777 P.2d 204, 210 (Alaska Ct. App. 1989). 
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counsel did not object in the proceeding for tactical reasons.170 This 
means that a competency evaluator may also testify to a defendant’s 
mental illness at the time of the offense, as long as they performed a 
separate evaluation.  
Pre-Clifton, there was at least an arguable position the defense 
could take to exclude evidence of competency evaluations in a possible 
GBMI situation. Now, the prosecution can not only present lay witness 
testimony of the defendant’s mental illness, but the prosecution can also 
bring in a former competency evaluator to testify about the defendant’s 
mental state at the time of the offense as long as they say a few magic 
words about objectivity and the defense does not object.171 
If the prosecution can bring a competency evaluator in the second 
half of a bifurcated GBMI trial to testify about the defendant’s mental 
illness at the time of the commission of the crime, which can then be 
used to aggravate and lengthen a defendant’s sentence, there is a huge 
tactical risk in bringing forth competency concerns at the preliminary 
stages of a client’s case. Seeking a competency evaluation would, in 
practice, expose a client to a GBMI finding at a bifurcated GBMI trial, 
and, consequently, to a longer prison term if the prosecution is 
successful in establishing GBMI. 
B. Ethical Issues: Defense and Prosecution 
Defense counsel has a duty to zealously advocate their client’s 
position, which in the criminal context includes limiting their exposure 
to incarceration.172 Attorneys also have a duty of confidentiality.173 The 
duty of confidentiality can be overcome to a limited degree in the case of 
a client with diminished capacity.174 If a lawyer reasonably believes their 
client has diminished capacity as a result of mental illness and cannot 
act reasonably to protect their own interests, the attorney may disclose 
information to a tribunal which would indicate the defendant may not 
be competent to stand trial and seek a competency evaluation.175 This 
 
 170.  Monroe v. State, 847 P.2d 84, 87 (Alaska Ct. App. 1993). 
 171.  The competency evaluator who testified in Ms. Clifton’s case is the same 
person who testified in Mr. Monroe’s trial 20 years ago: David Sperbeck. Clifton, 
315 P.3d at 699. 
 172.  ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (2009). This duty applies to all 
lawyers, not just defense counsel. Id. 
 173.  ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2009). 
 174.  See ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.14 (2009) (when taking 
protective action pursuant to paragraph (b), the lawyer is impliedly authorized 
under Rule 1.6(a) to reveal information about the client, but only to the extent 
reasonably necessary to protect the client’s interests). 
 175.  Id. 
ARTICLE 1 - JOHANSEN (DO NOT DELETE) 5/18/2015  2:01 PM 
2015 GUILTY BUT MENTALLY ILL 25 
decision is discretionary. The prosecution may then request a second 
competency evaluation (it is this second competency evaluation from 
which the prosecution can bring a competency evaluator as an expert 
witness post-Clifton). 
The A.B.A. Criminal Justice Standards advise that the contents of a 
competency evaluation “be considered privileged information and 
should be used only in a proceeding to determine the defendant’s 
competence.”176 The state’s use of the same competency evaluator as an 
expert witness at a bifurcated GBMI trial does not comply with the 
A.B.A. Criminal Justice Standards. It is unreasonable to believe that a 
competency evaluator who has seen a defendant several times, such as 
the evaluator in Clifton, could set aside both their observations and 
diagnosis and state to a jury completely objective opinions about the 
defendant’s mental state at the time of the offense as an expert witness. 
The State’s pursuit of GBMI also creates a Brady problem. The 
government has special duties to disclose to the defense all evidence that 
tends to negate guilt or mitigate an offense.177 In Brady v. Maryland,178 the 
Supreme Court of the United States held that withholding exculpatory 
evidence violates due process when the evidence is material to either 
“guilt or . . . punishment.”179 As the Clifton court of appeals stated, mental 
disease or defect in a GBMI determination will be relevant “to the type 
of disposition that the sentencing court should impose on the 
defendant,”180 any evidence of mental illness in order to mitigate a 
culpable mental state must be disclosed to the defense before trial. This 
places the government in an odd ontological position in the context of 
prosecution–initiated GBMI. On one hand, the government must view 
the evidence of mental illness as mitigating, material evidence that must 
be disclosed to the defense because it has the ability to defeat the mens 
rea element of the crime charged.181 On the other hand, the government 
may pull an about-face and use this evidence in a bifurcated GBMI 
proceeding to deny the defendant good-time parole.182 Therefore, in the 
second half of a bifurcated GBMI trial, the prosecution must disclose all 
evidence to the defense tending to negate a mental illness or risk 
violating their duties under ARPC 3.8(d) and Brady. While in trial, the 
 
 176.  A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS Mental Health Standard 7-4.6. 
 177.  ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009). 
 178.  373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
 179.  Id. at 87 (emphasis added). 
 180.  State v. Clifton, 315 P.3d 694, 707 (Alaska Ct. App. 2013) (dicta). 
 181.  A.B.A. CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS Mental Health Standard 7-9. See 
also, ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(d) (2009) (demonstrating the 
government’s duty to disclose evidence that mitigates guilt). 
 182.  Clifton, 315 P.3d at 707. 
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prosecution has a duty to disclose evidence tending to negate that very 
fact. 
This Brady problem reveals the prosecution’s unprincipled stance in 
the bifurcated GBMI context, and on its face shows a lack of good faith 
argument. In a situation where the defense presents evidence of mental 
illness at trial, this problem is easily solved: the prosecution in this 
scenario will almost invariably oppose the defense’s assertion of mental 
illness throughout each prong of the bifurcated trial in an unsuccessful 
NGI attempt, or throughout the trial in a defense-initiated GBMI trial. 
The consistency of argument when mental illness is brought forth by the 
defense does not implicate ethical issues regarding the special duties of 
prosecutors. However, the prosecution’s switch in a bifurcated GBMI 
trial shows that the conflicting use of evidence of mental illness by the 
prosecution cannot align with their responsibility as ministers of justice. 
Finally, it is likely post-Clifton that a prosecutor cannot try to 
bifurcate a trial for GBMI unless she has probable cause to believe that 
the defendant is mentally ill. A prosecutor cannot charge a crime unless 
she believes the charge is supported by probable cause.183 As Blakely has 
been applied to GBMI through Clifton and the 2012 statutory revisions, 
the prosecution must prove all elements of GBMI beyond a reasonable 
doubt, making the GBMI analogous to a sentencing aggravator. 
Additionally, because the A.B.A. Criminal Justice Standards advise 
attorneys to refrain from using competency evaluations in any 
proceeding other than a competency proceeding and Estelle 
distinguishes the use of a competency evaluation for only limited, 
neutral purposes, the prosecution should not use competency 
evaluations to support the probable cause for GBMI, and must rely on 
police reports, separate expert witnesses, and lay witness evidence 
alone. 
C. CRP Courts 
Post-Clifton, the prosecution will have little incentive to participate 
in the Coordinated Resource Projects (CRP) currently in effect in Alaska 
State District Courts. A CRP is a multi-dimensional, therapeutic court 
that emphasizes treatment and stability as a cornerstone to solving 
recidivism, desperation, and homelessness in Alaska’s mentally ill 
community.184 Anchorage’s CRP functions as a diversionary program 
designed to allow mentally ill misdemeanor defendants the opportunity 
 
 183.  ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8(a) (2009). 
 184.  ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, TRANSFERABILITY OF THE ANCHORAGE 
WELLNESS COURT MODEL (2008). 
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to have their misdemeanor charges dismissed or significantly reduced in 
exchange for following a court-ordered treatment plan.185 
The CRP program involves a team of psychologists interviewing 
the defendant, determining eligibility—i.e., that the person suffers from 
a mental illness—and setting up a treatment plan which may include 
medication, release to an assisted living facility, mandatory and frequent 
drug testing, and therapy with an appropriate treatment provider. 
Participation in the court usually takes a full year, and upon a successful 
completion the participant gets their bargained-for lesser sentence, a 
certificate of graduation, and a small gift. The defendant will come to 
several “check in” type hearings throughout their time in CRP court to 
ensure they remain compliant with the terms of a Rule 11 Agreement.186 
The hearings are adversarial. 
CRP court benefits the prosecution in that the defendant will 
hopefully solve the underlying mental illness that contributes to their 
criminal conduct, thus theoretically reducing recidivism. However, CRP 
court requires a certain level of specialized knowledge that prosecution 
typical prosecution does not present. A familiarity with the 
community’s mental health treatment options, health insurance and 
Medicaid, and a working knowledge of civil commitment and 
competency evaluations is necessary to properly represent and 
prosecute in CRP court. CRP court also requires a fair amount of 
attorney time.  
Prosecutorial use of GBMI risks the end of CRP court. Practically, 
prosecutors will reject CRP court if they could get the same benefit 
(mental health treatment) from a GBMI verdict. However, this is 
problematic because DoC mental health treatment offered, whether 
appropriate or not, would merely be a Band-Aid for larger collateral 
consequences of the mental illness including homelessness—a widely 
recognized problem in Alaska. CRP Courts work to provide a support 
system while the mentally ill person is receiving treatment outside of 
prison. To avoid CRP courts in favor of GBMI would deny the 
community the benefit of seeing its neighbors properly housed, stable, 
and able to receive much-needed mental health intervention. 
 
 185.  Alaska Coordinated Resources Project: Alaska Mental Health Court, ALASKA 
COURT SYSTEM 2 (September 2006), http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/ 
centerforhumandevelopment/fulllives/pastconferences/upload/judge-
rhoadesPub-100-Anchorage-Coordinated-Resources-Project-9-06.pdf. 
 186.  A Rule 11 Agreement is a plea bargain in Alaska. ALASKA R. CRIM. P. 11. 
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D. GBMI: Will Its Use Expand Post-Clifton? 
The Clifton decision unequivocally allows the prosecution to 
present mental illness as a potential aggravating factor into criminal 
prosecutions through GBMI. This creates a risk that the State of Alaska 
may try to extend more sentences, and open up the possibility of post-
incarceration civil commitment, for the mentally ill in non-traditionally 
NGI or GBMI charges (rather than functionally limiting NGI/GBMI use 
to high-exposure crimes like murder). For example, GBMI may infringe 
on the State’s willingness to participate in the Coordinated Resources 
Project Courts (CRP or Mental Health Court) for misdemeanors and 
low-level felonies, supra. GBMI is a powerful tool for prosecutors to limit 
parole and/or furlough to the mentally ill. 
It seems very likely that after the court of appeals has given its 
blessing to prosecution-initiated GBMI that its use will expand into 
lower-level felonies and perhaps even misdemeanor crimes. The relative 
ease of proving what is a lower standard than M’Naghten insanity in a 
GBMI trial will encourage prosecutors to impose GBMI on defendants. 
Prosecutors may think they are serving justice by helping the 
mentally ill receive treatment in prison or jail. However, this could not 
be further from the truth. In pursuing a GBMI verdict, they are actually 
subjecting the mentally ill offender to longer prison sentences, branding 
defendants with the stigma of mental illness, limiting their access to 
mental health care of their own choosing, and possibly creating the 
opportunity for abuse and maltreatment from other inmates. It is, as is 
Artegall’s squire Talus (the “iron man”) from Spencer’s The Faerie 
Queene, the allegorical equivalent to justice without mercy. 
CONCLUSION 
A year and a half after the Alaska Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Clifton, Ms. Karan Clifton’s case continues in the superior court. Now 
that the issue of guilt has been decided, it only remains to present the 
GBMI determination to a jury. A trial on this matter is currently 
scheduled for July 2015.  
This article argues that both prosecution and defense counsel 
should avoid the GBMI verdict. GBMI offends justice and when raised 
by the State implicates ethical questions on the part of the prosecution. 
We are measured by how we treat the most vulnerable members of 
our community. Although Ms. Clifton does not lend herself to deep 
sympathy, she is an extremely disabled woman. Because of her illness 
she behaves in a way that necessitates her confinement from the public 
and results in a significant loss of freedom. She did not choose to be a 
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mentally ill person and yet her illness has confined her both 
psychologically and physically.  
This Article should not be read to minimize or excuse Ms. Clifton’s 
actions. The victim in this case, and indeed all Alaskans, are entitled to 
live their lives in safety. However, we should endeavor to punish people 
only for their choices. Not, as in prosecution-initiated GBMI, for their 
disabilities. 
